In this paper, we look at the (Kajii and Ui) mixed equilibrium notion, which has been recognized by previous literature as a natural solution concept for incomplete information games in which players have multiple priors on the space of payoff relevant states. We investigate the problem of stability of mixed equilibria with respect to perturbations on the sets of multiple priors. We find out that the (Painlevé-Kuratowski) convergence of posteriors ensures that stability holds; whereas, convergence of priors is not enough to obtain stability since it does not always implies convergence of posteriors when we consider updating rules (for multiple priors) based on the classical Bayesian approach.
Introduction
Many results have been obtained in the literature showing that limits of equilibria of perturbed games are equilibria of the unperturbed game as perturbed games converge to the unperturbed one in the appropriate sense (see for instance [8] for the standard problem, [7] , [12] , [13] , [16] , [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] , [24] for recent results under relaxed or different assumptions). This limit property has interesting implications because it provides a useful theoretical tool for the comparative statics analysis on Nash equilibria and underlies the classical theory on Nash equilibrium refinements based on stability with respect to trembles (see [23] for a survey and a complete list of references).
Aim of this paper is to study the limit property for an equilibrium notion, called mixed equilibrium, defined by Kajii and Ui in [10] and therein recognized as one of the most natural solution concepts for a class of incomplete information games under ambiguity. In their work, Kajii and Ui partially follow the Harsanyi's approach as they assume that the source of uncertainty can be expressed by an underlying state space (i.e. payoff relevant states); but, at the same time, they deviate from the classical model of uncertainty, in which agents are endowed with a single common prior (probability distribution) over the state space, since they allow for multiple priors that are not necessarily common across agents 1 . In particular, the mixed equilibrium concept is an interim equilibrium concept in which each player chooses the best action for any realization of a private signal in equilibrium. As emphasized in [10] , an ex ante equilibrium notion could also be defined in their framework in a natural way, but it turns out that a player with multiple priors tends to exhibit dynamic inconsistent behavior, meaning that a strategy that is optimal ex ante may specify actions that are not optimal once private information is received 2 . However, the interim approach is more interesting in the applications while the ex ante one has only theoretical implications.
In this paper we look at the problem of stability of mixed equilibria with respect to perturbations on the sets of priors. The question is whether the limit of a sequence of mixed equilibria, corresponding to a family of sequences of perturbed sets of priors 3 , is a mixed equilibrium of the game in which each set of priors is obtained as the limit of the corresponding sequence of sets of priors. A particular case is the one in which the sequences of sets of priors all converge to the same (common) single prior. The question in this case is whether the limit of the sequence of mixed equilibria is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the 1 That is, each player is endowed with a set of priors (probability distributions) over the state space; these sets might different. 2 In the Harsanyi's framework, the ex ante maximization of utility coincides with the interim notion because the expected utility model with Bayesian updating is dynamically consistent.
3 That is, a sequence for each player.
incomplete information game corresponding to the limit common prior. The problem we address in this paper is also motivated by an interesting counterexample presented in [10] in which it is shown that limits of mixed equilibria of perturbed games are not necessarily equilibria in the unperturbed game, even when the perturbed sets of priors converge in the sense of Painlevé-Kuratowski to the sets of priors of the unperturbed game. In this work, we show that the limit property for mixed equilibria holds depending on how players update probabilities (evaluate posteriors) after the observation of the signal. More precisely, our limit theorem states that the (Painlevé-Kuratowski) convergence of posteriors ensures that the limit property holds; whereas, a final counterexample 4 shows that the convergence of priors is not enough for the limit property since it does not always implies convergence of posteriors when we consider updating rules (for multiple priors) based on the classical Bayesian approach.
Related literature on ambiguous games
The recent literature on ambiguous games has investigated possible generalizations of the Nash equilibrium concept in presence of ambiguous beliefs, that is, beliefs which cannot be expressed as a single probability distribution over contingencies (see for instance [5] , [14] , [11] , [6] , [15] , [10] , [2] and [4] and references therein). In some of these papers, ambiguous beliefs concern the set of payoff relevant states (this is the classical ambiguity problem in the single agent case), in others, ambiguity arises specifically from the strategic interaction since it involves players' beliefs about their opponents' behavior. In [4] , we propose a model in which ambiguity is summarized by beliefs correspondences which represent the exogenous ability of each player to put restrictions on beliefs over outcomes consistently with the strategy profile and introduce the corresponding equilibrium notion (called equilibrium under ambiguous beliefs correspondences). In particular, that model embodies the class of incomplete information games without private information and with multiple priors on the set of payoff relevant states, but it also includes some models in which ambiguity concerns beliefs over opponents' strategy choices.
The question whether the limit property extends to the equilibrium concepts in ambiguous games has not been completely clarified yet in the literature. On the one hand, the nature of the definition of equilibrium makes it reasonable to expect that the extension to ambiguous games holds. On the other hand, [10] shows that the extension fails in simple examples. In [3] it is shown that the limit property holds for equilibria under ambiguous beliefs correspondences; key for this result is the sequential convergence assumption imposed on the sequence of beliefs correspondences. The sensitivity of equilibrium to ambiguity is also discussed by [22] in a different context. In fact, an equilibrium notion for ambiguous games which relies on the Beweley unanimity rule is therein defined. This concept is then used to construct approximations of standard Bayesian equilibria.
The model
We consider a finite set of players I = {1, . . . n}. For every player i,
} is the (finite) pure action set of player i, Ψ = i∈I Ψ i and Ψ −i = j =i Ψ j . Denote with X i the set of mixed actions of player i, that is, each action
Denote also with X = n j=1 X j and with X −i = j =i X j . Let Θ be a finite set of payoff relevant states and denote with Δ(Θ) the set all the probability distribution over Θ. Then, player i has a payoff function f i : Ψ × Θ → R and a set of priors P i ⊆ Δ(Θ) over Θ.
We follow the Kajii and Ui's setup in [10] . The incompleteness of information is summarized by a random signal τ = (τ i ) i∈I . When states θ ∈ Θ occurs, player i privately observes a signal τ i (θ) and then chooses a pure strat-
) is a vector in X i where each component σ i (ψ i |t i ) denotes the probability of player i choosing action ψ i when he observes t i . The set of all the strategies σ i of player i is denoted by S i ; moreover,
Given P ∈ P i and t i ∈ T i , denote with P (·|t i ) ∈ Δ(Θ) the conditional probabilities over Θ, that is
be the set of conditional probability distributions once t i has been observed 5 . An updating rule Φ i :
Full Bayesian Updating Rule. 5 Degenerate probabilities are implicitly ruled out from P i (t i ) in this formulation. That is, if P ∈ P i is such that P (τ
After t i is observed, player i uses posteriors in Φ i (t i ) to evaluate his actions. The interim payoff to a randomized action
In line with the work of [15] , ambiguity is solved by considering two different kind of (extreme) attitudes towards ambiguity: pessimism and optimism. In a multiple priors setting, the pessimistic attitude towards ambiguity is modelled by preferences which evaluate an ambiguous belief by the worst expected utility possible given the set of probability distributions ( [9] ). Similarly, an ambiguityloving or optimistic agent evaluates beliefs by the most optimistic expected utility possible with the given set of probability distributions.
More precisely, a pessimistic player i has the (interim) pessimistic payoff defined by
while, an optimistic player i has the (interim) optimistic payoff defined by
Assuming that players are partitioned in optimistic and pessimistic ones, that is,
is the corresponding game 6 . Then
Definition 2.1 A strategy profile σ * ∈ S is a Kajii and Ui mixed equilibrium for the game G O,P if for every θ ∈ Θ it follows that
6 When a game G O,P is considered, then it is implicitly assumed that its utility functions V 
exist for every x ∈ X, t i ∈ T i and σ ∈ S); obviously, this latter condition is guaranteed, for instance, when posteriors Φ i (t i ) are closed and not empty sets for every t i ∈ T i .
The limit theorem
Given, for every player i, a sequence {P i,ν } ν∈AE of sets of priors over Θ and a sequence {Φ i,ν } ν∈AE of updating rules, i.e. Φ i,ν : 
Recall that (see for instance [1] or [17] ):
where S(x, ε) is the ball in R s with center x and radius ε. 
Let {σ * ν } ν∈AE be a sequence of strategy profiles such that each σ * ν is a mixed equi-
Proof. Let {(x 1,ν , . . . , x n,ν )} ν∈AE ⊂ X be a sequence of mixed actions profiles converging to (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X and {(σ 1,ν , . . . , σ n,ν )} ν∈AE ⊂ S be a sequence of strategy profiles converging to (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) ∈ S. Fixed θ ∈ Θ, by definition, we recall that
7 Again, it is implicitly assumed that the utility functions V First, we prove that the following conditions hold
In fact, for every ν, V O i,ν and V P i,ν are well posed by definition so there exist Q θ,ν and Q θ,ν in Φ i,ν (τ i (θ)) such that
For every converging subsequence
From the assumptions it follows that Lim sup
converges and, from (14), its limit is
Following the same steps, for every converging subsequence (16) Since (15) and (16) hold respectively for all converging subsequences
) k∈AE , then we get the following conditions respectively for the upper and lower limits of the sequences 
Moreover, for every ν ∈ N, we get by definitions (6) and (7) that
Hence, for every converging subsequences
and lim
Since (19) and (20) hold respectively for the converging subsequences
then we get the following conditions respectively for the lower and upper limits of the sequences
Therefore, for every (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X and for every (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) ∈ S, for every sequence { (x 1,ν , . . . , x n,ν )} ν∈AE ⊂ X converging to (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and every sequence { (σ 1,ν , . . . , σ n,ν )} ν∈AE ⊂ S converging to (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ), conditions (17) and (21) imply that (10) holds, while, conditions (18) and (22) imply that (11) holds, for every player i. Now, let {σ * ν } ν∈AE be the sequence of strategy profiles converging to σ * where each σ * ν is an equilibrium of G O,P ν . Given θ ∈ Θ and a player i ∈ O, by definition it follows that, for every ν ∈ N,
From (10) and taking the limit as ν → ∞, we get
Following the same steps and from (11), we get that for a pessimistic player i ∈ P it follows that
Since, θ is arbitrary then σ * is a mixed equilibrium of G O,P and we get the assertion. 2
A counterexample
The key assumption in the previous limit theorem is contained in formula (5) which involves two conditions respectively on upper and lower limits of the sequences of sets of posteriors. In this section we present the Kajii and Ui counterexample and we emphasize that the limit property of the equilibria fails by removing from the assumption (5) even only one of these two conditions. More precisely, it turns out that in this example, the limit property of the equilibria fails because the condition on the upper limits is not satisfied.
The example consists in a 2 player game. The set of states is Θ = {1, 2, 3a, 3b, 4a, 4b}. For every ε ∈ [0, 1] , players have a common set of priors over Θ, which is:
The ranges of the two signals (τ 1 , τ 2 ) are
and, for every θ ∈ Θ, τ i (θ) ∈ T i is the set containing θ. Assume that both players use the Full Bayesian Updating Rule and are pessimistic. Then, for every ε ∈ [0, 1] the posteriors of Player 1 are
For every ε ∈]0, 1], the posteriors of Player 2 are
and
while, for ε = 0, they are:
The previous formulas show that the updated probabilities of the set E do not depend on the signal for both the players:
Then, for every ε > 0 and for every pair (t 1 , t 2 ) ∈ T 1 × T 2 , the game is
We denote the mixed actions as follows: 2 = prob(L) and 1 − x 2 = prob(R). Therefore, with an abuse of notation, x 1 identifies a mixed action of Player 1 and x 2 a mixed action of Player 2. The utility of Player 2 does not depend on Player 1's action choice so
Hence, action x 2 = 0 is strictly dominant for Player 2 regardless of the signal. So, the mixed strategy σ * 2,ε , defined by σ * 2,ε (t 2 ) = 0 for all t 2 ∈ T 2 , is a strictly dominant strategy for Player 2. It is trivial to check that there exists a unique best reply σ * 1,ε of Player 1 to Player 2's strategy σ * 2,ε . This is defined by σ * 1,ε (t 1 ) = 0 for all t 1 ∈ T 1 . This implies that, for every ε > 0, the set of equilibria is given by N(ε) = {(σ * 1,ε , σ * 2,ε )}. Now, for ε = 0 and for every pair (t 1 , t 2 ) ∈ T 1 × T 2 , the game is L R U 1,1 0,0 D 0,1 1,0 It follows directly that the mixed strategy σ 2 , defined by σ 2 (t 2 ) = 1 for all t 2 ∈ T 2 , is a strictly dominant strategy for Player 2. Since there exists a unique best reply σ 1 of Player 1 to Player 2's strategy σ 2 , defined by σ 2 (t 1 ) = 1 for all t 1 ∈ T 1 , then the set of equilibria for ε = 0 is given by N(0) = {( σ 1 , σ 2 )}. It immediately follows that for every sequence ε ν → 0, the corresponding sequence of equilibria {(σ * 1,εν , σ * 2,εν )} ν∈AE do not converge to the unique equilibrium ( σ 1 , σ 2 ) in N(0). Now we show that the failure of the limit property in this example depends on a lack of the sequential upper convergence property of the sequence of posteriors of Player 2. This can be easily seen: consider the probability distribution P ∈ Δ(Θ) defined by P (1) = 1 and P (θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ \ {1}. It easily follows that P ∈ Φ 2,εν ({1, 3a, 4a}) for every ν ∈ N since P can be obtained from (23) when λ = μ = 0 for every ε ν . Hence P ∈ Lim sup ν→∞ Φ 2,εν ({1, 3a, 4a}).
However, from (25), we immediately get that P / ∈ Φ 2,0 ({1, 3a, 4a}). So 
